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Abstract: To clarify the causal links between financial activity and economic growth, three
theoretical models are analyzed and a structural equation path models is estimated. In the
modeling part, poverty traps result from large fixed costs or high proportions of real
investment to run a financial sector. Human capital allocated to financial activities will
improve long-run levels but may reduce growth rates in the short run. Empirically, based on
data for 93 countries during the 1980–90 period, it is shown that during the 1980s finance was
predominantly a supply-leading determinant of economic growth. Our analysis suggests,
however, that this general finding cannot be confirmed for the less developed countries,
thereby giving some support to the conclusions derived from the theoretical modeling.
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Does Financial Activity Cause Economic Growth?
1  Introduction
The causal relationships between financial activity and economic growth are still very far
from being well understood. The literature concerned with these questions can be loosely
grouped into the following four categories.
Firstly, financial activity and economic growth are seen as not causally related. In this view,
the observable correlation between them is spurious: economies grew, and so did their
financial sectors, but the two followed their own logic.
Secondly, financial activity is taken to be the result of economic activity. Financial
development is thus demand-driven.1 As the growing scale of economic activities requires
more and more capital, institutional raising and pooling of funds for industry are substituted
for individual fortunes and retained profits.
Thirdly, financial activity is seen as a determinant of economic growth. In this view, the line
of causation runs from financial to real activity, where finance is one among other growth-
inducing factors. Finance thus acts as a supply-leading growth device. Specifically, recent
theoretical models give rationales for the assumption that well functioning monetary and
banking systems and capital markets may be crucial for economic growth. The arguments
vary, but Schumpeterian authors as well as some Neo-Keynesians usually stress the banking
system's ability to create money and channel it into productive and innovative uses. Others
claim that it is the information gathering and processing, which is accomplished by
professional actors on credit and capital markets, that helps to improve the efficiency of
capital allocation.2
Fourthly, some scholars see financial activity – at least occasionally – as an impediment to
real economic activity. Thus, as in the previous case, the line of causation runs from finance
to real activity; but the focus lies on the potentially destabilizing effects of financial
overtrading and crises. Specifically, this view sees the financial system as inherently unstable.
While some theoreticians are ready to include commercial banks into the sources of financial
distress, most proponents direct their attention towards stock markets or international capital
flows. Arguments supporting this view are given by a wide range of distinguished economists
including – among others – KEYNES (1936), DIAMOND/DYBVIG (1983), SINGH (1997) and
KRUGMAN (1996).
Unfortunately, there is no simple procedure to determine which view is empirically adequate,
since the factors that govern economic growth admittedly include many others besides
financial development; and interactions among them are likely to prevail. Moreover, the
existing cross-country data on financial activity are plagued by poor reliability and dubious
validity.
What are the lessons that may be learnt from economic history? First, as PATRICK (1966),
GOLDSMITH (1969, 1987), CAMERON ET AL. (1967), and others have shown, in the now
developed countries, modern financial systems generally evolved during the very early stages
of their industrialization.
                                                          
1 The opposition 'demand-following' vs. 'supply-leading' finance was suggested by PATRICK (1966).
2 For a detailed survey cf. LEVINE (1997).3
Moreover, financial development – as measured by GOLDSMITH'S financial interrelation ratio
(conveniently proxied by M2/GDP) – generally leveled off after a few decades, reaching its
fully developed stage3 by the beginning of the twentieth century. These historical
observations imply that in the process of industrialization finance may have been supply-
leading rather than demand-following.
In addition to this, the traditional financial sectors of the present LDC's are very similar to the
financial systems of the DC's prior to their industrialization. As many observers have noted
(SHAW 1973, MCKINNON 1973, FRY 1995 – to name just the most prominent), financial
dualism is the rule outside the developed part of the world: enclaves of modern finance,
mostly located in the commercial center, serve but a few export oriented firms, whereas the
majority of economic transactions takes place in the traditional sector which – leaving aside
local peculiarities – is basically functioning in the same way as it did in the now developed
countries before their industrialization. This observation implies that in the financially and
economically less developed countries, there might be a latent, but unexploited potential for
growth.
2  Theoretical analysis
2.  Modeling the financial-real development nexus
2.1  The role of physical capital in financial development
2.1.1  Investing in a financial sector
Within New Growth Theory type of models, the financial sector is often referred to as an
immaterial production factor (e.g. ROMER 1993: 544). It improves the productivity of physical
capital through the activities of the financial system. A key reference is PAGANO'S approach
assuming that "a proportion 1-I  of the flow of savings is 'lost' in the process of financial
intermediation" (PAGANO 1993: 614). Hence, I  is a measure of the efficiency of the financial
sector. A second measure reflecting financial development is the productivity parameter A, as
the financial sector helps improving the allocation of new investment. But PAGANO left open
to discussion an explicit link between improving the productivity A and the necessity to invest
real resources to improve financial efficiency I . To close this link is the purpose of our first
modeling approach.
We assume that the economy's relative effort, f = (1 – I ) to invest part of total investment I to
the financial sector, will improve incrementally the production technology  ) (K At  for
tomorrows output  1  t Y  as follows: it affects depreciated, already existing technology
(.) ) 1 ( 1   t F A G  and, in addition, enlarges capital productivity, both, for simplicity, in the same
way by some function af:
. ) ( )) ( ) 1 (( ) ( 1 K a K A a K A f t F f t      G                                                   (1)
                                                          
3 Note, however, that financial interrelation ratios for developed economies vary considerably (from less than
unity to up to three) from country to country due to different institutional frameworks such as government
provision of pension schemes, structure of the housing market or the level of commitment to rules and
norms in financial relations.4
Assuming af to be proportional to effort f, say af = 1 – I , and linear w.r.t. its impact on
technology, and dividing by K, equation (1) may be written as
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Hence, the steady-state technology is characterized by
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Given the technology in equation (1') in the presence of a financial sector to be constructed
over time, what does this mean for a developing economy having the choice to stay at
"cottage production", characterized by a simple AK technology, say
A't (K) = A' K                                                                                       (3'')
resulting in capital growth J
o = I   ' A s  – G , or to switch to production in the presence of a
financial sector to be built up over time as in equation (1')? Let us assume that the economy
prefers higher steady-state growth rates to lower ones. Then, we get
Proposition1: Financial development, as characterized by equation (1'), is preferable to
"cottage production" technology if and only
if  ' * A A !  or, for A' = 1; 1 – I  > 1 – (1 –  F G ) (1 – I ).
In other words, allocating relatively high levels 1 – I  of investment to construct a financial
sector may be necessary to assure that, in the steady state, real production will favor from the
presence of a financial sector though, during the transition period, the efficiency of real
production may suffer for some period, i.e.
. * 2 1 J J J J       
o                                                             (4)
2.1.2  Big-push solution and poverty trap
In the previous section, we have demonstrated that financial development may improve
macroeconomic production if the proportion of total investment the economy is willing to
spend in building up the financial sector is not too small, independent of the level of capital
available to the economy. The decision for financial development may become more complex5
if establishing a financial sector surmounts a large fixed cost (see, e.g., MURPHY/SHLEIFER/
VISHNY 1989). Here, we assume that real production is characterized by a standard Cobb-
Douglas technology but to guarantee the working of the financial sector the economy has to
carry fixed costs c·L proportional to population size, or
D D     
1 ) , ( L K A cL L K F F                                                         (5)
otherwise, "cottage production" prevails:
                                        . ) , (
1
F
o o o A A with L K A L K F   
D D
Dividing equation (5) by total population L and using y = Y/L, k = K/L and f(k) = F(k,1), this
finally results in
1 / / ) (
    
D k A k c k k f F                                                               (5')
Denoting by s the economy's savings rate and by n + G the amount of capital growth necessary
to outweigh population growth and depreciation, we get the economy's net capital growth rate
J as
. ) ( ) / (
1 G J
D      
 n k A k c s F                                                     (6)
The shape of the functional relation (6) between capital k and growth rates J (see figure 1)
immediately implies, by standard arguments,
Proposition 2: If financial development implies a big-push technology, as characterized
by equation (5), there exist two steady states 
* * *
H H L k where k k   is stable and
* * *
H H L k where k k   is unstable:
for , 0 :





! k H k k J i.e. k converges to 
*
H k  .
This means that in the presence of a big push technology a developing economy will start
financial development if its level k of capital is high enough, otherwise it will refrain from
doing so as financial development would detrimentally exhaust the existing provision with
physical goods. This result reflects in part why the evolutionary paths of developing countries
differ in a wide range with regard to their timing in taking up the process of financial
development.
2.2  The role of human capital in financial development
In this section, we materialize financial activities to become a production factor when
investing in human capital. We extend the UZAWA-LUCAS model to permit the society to
choose how much of the scarce resource 'human capital' will be allocated in form of working
skills and how much in form of skills employed in the financial intermediation process. Both
forms constitute input factors into real production. To simplify matters, our presentation of
the model is based on the UZAWA-LUCAS model as described in BARRO/SALA-I-MARTIN
(1995). We consider a Cobb-Douglas production function with three input factors, physical
capital K with elasticity D, working skills HR with elasticity E1, and human capital HF in the6
financial sector with elasticity E2, where E1 + E2 = 1 – D and u·H = HR + HF is human capital
invested in production and (1 – u) H is human capital invested in education. Setting u1 =
HR/H, u2 = HF/H and u = u1 + u2, the economy is described by the process of real production,
the accumulation of human capital and the household's utility function as follows
2 1 ) ( ) ( 2 1
E E D G H u H u AK K K C Y                                         (7.1)
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where u (C) = (C
(1-T) – 1)/ (1 – T). Utility maximization of the household, as the producer of
goods, leads to the Hamiltonian
>@ > @ H H u B K C Y e C u C u u J
t G P G Q Q P
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 ) 1 ( ) ( ) , , ; , ( 2 1      (8)
where K, H, Y are state variables and u1, u2 and C are control variables. From wJ / wu2 = 0 for
u1 = 1 – u2, we get
2 1 2 1 / / E E   u u                                                                         (9)
so that rewriting  ) ( / ), ( / 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 E E E E E E       u u u u
results in
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Replacing Y by Y
~
 in equation (8), the optimal solution of the resulting Hamiltonian J
~
 differs
from the two-sector model of UZAWA-LUCAS only in replacing A by  A
~
. Note that the switch
from the two-sector technology (here, setting  ) 0 2 2 u     E  to the three-sector technology
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Let Z = K/H, F = C/K and
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the average product of physical capital in real production. The steady-state values as well as
the transition paths of the economy on the stable arm are well-known (e.g. BARRO/SALA-I-
MARTIN (1995, chap. 5.2.2)). We restate the values in the steady-state7
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where                                           T T G U M B / )] 1 ( [      .
Hence, only the relation Z  between physical and human capital is affected by switching from
the two-sector to the three-sector model with financial activities in addition to working skills
as input factors. More precisely,
Proposition 3: If financial development implies that human capital is allocated in form
of working skills and financial-intermediation skills, as characterized by equation (7.1)
then, in the steady state, human capital must be larger relative to physical capital than in
case of a unique sector of human capital, i.e.
* * ~ Z Z                                                                               (13)
The transitional dynamics for  Z F ~ ~ , ~ , ~ and u z  are given by
*) ( ) 1 ( ~ z z z      D J                                                           (14.1)
*) ( *) z z ( ) / ) (( ~ F F T T D J F                                           (14.2)
*) ~ ( *) u u ~ ( B u ~ F F J                                                         (14.3)
*) ~ ( *) ~ )( / ( ~ ~ u u B z z       F Z J T D J  .                                  (14.4)
We can now explore the transition dynamics of an economy having switched from a two-
sector economy to a three-sector economy with skills differentiated for the working process
and the process of financial intermediation. The economy we have in mind is a developing
country characterized by scarce human resources (though the analysis below holds generally).
In order to derive at well defined starting values of the adjustment process on the stable arm
of the three-sector economy, we assume that the two-sector economy was already in its steady
state at some time t0 when it opts for financial development (for given values E1 and E2 such
that E1 + E2 = 1 – D. Furthermore, D < T). The adjustment process, starting from t0 = 0, to its
new steady state can be characterized, according to equation (14), by noting that while
switching to a technology with financial intermediation the system starts with
0 * ) 0 ( ~
~ !  z and z z J  for all subsequent t                       (15.1)
The latter relation follows from (14.1). Similarly,
0 * ) 0 ( ~
~ !  F J F F and  for all subsequent t .                     (15.2)8
The first relation holds, because  * ) 0 ( ~ F F t  together with  * ) 0 ( ~ z z   would imply  0 ~ ! F J
from equation (14.2), hence  * ) t ( ~ F F !  which contradicts the convergence property on the
new stable arm. The stable path property implies, finally,  0 ~ ! F J  (the stability conditions for
equations (14) are intensively discussed in BARRO/SALA-I-MARTIN (1995:206-207)).
Similar arguments show that also the control variable u must drop down to reach the new
stable path. Hence, on the stable arm, we have
0 * ) 0 ( ~
~ !  u and u u J  for all subsequent t .                        (15.3)
Finally, we get
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As is well known, the dynamics for  ) (
~
t Y  are more complex. If we characterize the starting
position of a developing economy by scarce human resources relative to physical capital, i.e.
Z ~-values exceeding the new steady-state level 
* ~ Z  quite considerably, this economy would
realize very high real growth rates at the first instant, which continually decrease thereafter. In
an intermediate period, real growth may become negative to be followed by growth rates
approaching 
* J : figure 2 represents the dynamic processes, as considered here, graphically.
Summarizing, the adjustment path is characterized by immediate adjustments to a lower
consumption level  ) 0 (
~
C  and a higher fraction  )) 0 ( ~ 1 ( u   of human capital invested in human
capital production. While physical capital will grow at lower levels, human capital
accumulation is considerably stimulated to reach the new steady-state relation where, again,
physical and human capital are growing at the same rate 
* J . Real production will – after a
transition period of, maybe negative, growth – also adjust to the steady-state growth rate. As
the points in time when developing economies decide to start with financial development vary
considerably, the pattern of observed real growth rates may be quite dispersed. Economies
having invested in financial development over a long period of time are more likely to reveal
growth rates, at least for broad real output including GDP created for human capital
accumulation, whose dynamics are mainly determined by the dynamics of u, the fraction of
human capital used in production (for a more explicit discussion see BARRO/SALA-I-MARTIN
(1995: 187)).
3  Empirical analysis
The objective of the following empirical cross-country analysis is to investigate the asserted
causal relationship from financial development to economic growth in a large sample of
countries (DC's as well as LDC's). To this end, a three-stage research strategy will be
followed.
Following GRAFF (2000), the first step is to collect for a large sample of countries and various
years different indicators for financial development (FD) that – as reliably as possible –
capture the share of resources a society devotes to run its financial system at any given time.
In contrast to the usual indicators of financial repression/liberalization and financial depth,9
which frequently suffer from ambiguity (expressing monetary and credit volumes as well as
financial overheating and likelihood of financial crash), the FD-indicators suggested here rely
on real inputs and, therefore, stand for a well-defined macro-economic concept. Accordingly,
we consider them more adequate for investigations into the sources of economic growth than
the FD-indicators suggested so far.
Moreover, while monetary indicators like M2/GDP are very hard to compare across time and
space due to institutional diversity and change, our FD-variables are likely to be less sensitive
to minor changes in institutional regulations, domestic and international shocks and business
cycles.
Last but not least, since the shape and the scope of a financial system is firmly rooted in a
country's history, our indicators may be assumed to capture very basic characteristics of an
economy's structure. Consequently, the quantitative approximation of the notion 'financial
development' suggested here is probably less endogenous to current economic activity than
the traditional FD-variables.
The second step is to investigate the causal structure between financial and real activity. To
this end, a two-wave path (LISREL) model with our indicators suggested here to constitute a
'latent'  FD-proxy variable on the one hand and the log of per worker income Y/L (as a
straight-forward proxy for the level of 'real' economic development or, if seen from the
production side: labor productivity) on the other is estimated.4
The third step is to relax the equality-restriction for the structural parameters for different sub-
samples that we define by Y/L. In this way, we shall be looking for potential structural breaks
between DC's and LDC's of our sample
3.1  A new proxy for financial development
The construction of our new 'latent' variable FD for financial development is motivated by the
interest to get a reasonably reliable and comparable quantification of the share of resources a
society devotes to run its financial system. While this intention bears some resemblance to the
core argument of transactions cost and institutionalist economics (cf. NORTH 1990,
WILLIAMSON 1985), namely that aggregate transaction costs are very far from negligible and
that financial institution are a major response to this problem, we depart from the closely
connected evolutionist argument that prevailing institutions – having survived the selection
mechanism of the market – are the 'adequate' solution. Instead, we regard the amount of
resources devoted to run these institutions as an indicator of the effort to keep transaction cost
(as well as frictions and market failures due to informational asymmetry that are mitigated by
the financial system) low. This notion of financial development is thus very different from the
common notion of financial depth; it signifies a real rather than a monetary phenomenon.5
The idea to measure the operating costs of a given financial system seems plain enough – why
has this not been tried before?6 Presumably, part of the answer may lie in the fact that no
                                                          
4  Referring to structural modeling with LISREL, we methodologically depart from Graff (2000), where
similar path analyses are conducted by OLS and TSLQ regression techniques.
5 It is not claimed that the traditional notion of financial depth is not useful, but the degree of monetization
and the aggregate credit volume channeled through the financial system – i.e. the 'traditional' variables –
and the amount of resources needed to run a given financial system stand for very different economic
functions: While the former inform about the prevailing channels of finance, the latter measure the intensity
of financial services.
6 At least, to the best of our knowledge, there is no cross-country study other than GRAFF (2000) that has
attempted to do this.10
international statistics supply reliable and readily comparable data. The three indicators which
we consider suitable for consideration, the share of the labor force employed in the financial
system (EMPL), the share of the financial system in GDP (FINAN), and the number of banks
and branches per worker (BANKW), though distributed by distinguished institutions, are
strikingly unreliable. Not only do the numerous footnotes indicate that the reported numbers
are neither comparable across countries nor through time for a given country. Worse is that
conceptual changes as well as retrospective recalculations sometimes appear in subsequent
volumes without any notice. Moreover, missing values and obvious errors add to the trouble.
Finally, these numbers have to be transformed into the desired ratios (normalized to labor
force or GDP, respectively) by hand.
For a study of finance and development in a cross-sample of countries which intends to cover
more than a very limited number of years, all mentioned variables are thus very far from
satisfactory. What follows, therefore, rests on the assumption that the raw numbers can be
transformed in a way that makes them reasonably reliable, complete and valid measures for
the intended notion of 'resources for finance'.
The procedure chosen here is to identify the common variance of the three indicators referring
to the concept of 'latent' variables. If the operating costs of the financial system are reasonably
well represented by such a latent variable, it can serve as a better proxy for FD than individual
scores for a single indicator alone.7
Practically, to prepare the raw data, the three normalized indicator-variables (share of
manpower employed in the financial system, share of the financial system in GDP, number of
banks and branches per capita) were carefully screened for obvious errors and
incompatibilities. Next, the yearly values of the normalized variables were transformed into
five-year averages for 1980 and 1990. Then, operational rules had to be formulated how to
treat missing values.8 Finally, the remaining data for 93 countries and five points in time were
pooled into a two-wave panel and standardized.
3.2  A two-wave path (LISREL) model
Causality analysis continues to be an unresolved problem in econometrics; usually one will
only detect correlation without empirical indication on cause and consequence (if there are
any).9 Our empirical analysis relies on a particular notion of causality, namely "post hoc ergo
propter hoc", i.e. sequentiality is taken to imply causality. Though posteriority is not
sufficient to prove causality, it certainly is – at least in most economic contexts – a necessary
condition and therefore a reliable indicator for the possibility of a causal relationship.
The basic statistical intuition – path analysis with panel data – is established in biological
research since the 30s, and sociologists have referred to it at least since the 60s (DUNCAN
1966, HEISE 1970). Economists, however, have concentrated more on time series based
                                                          
7 That is, if the correlations between the desired representations are high, but measurement errors or
stochastic shocks have little common variance. To come close to this goal, a 'technical' condition is that the
indicator variables have to be measured independently. This condition is satisfied here. Our three indicators
for the size of the financial system are compiled from data published by ILO, UN and BANKERS'
ALMANAC, respectively.
8 The general strategy was to estimate missing values in time by interpolation, extrapolation, trend analysis,
and – where possible – by regression on exogenous variables, but to exclude all observations, where the
majority of data would result from estimation rather than from original data.
9 Earlier contributions are, therefore, rather skeptical about the possibilities of detecting causal relationships
by means of quantitative analyses (e.g. GOLDSMITH 1969).11
concepts of causality, so that applications similar to the one presented here are not yet
common in the economic literature.10 Some methodological remarks are therefore in order.
This section presents a structural equation (LISREL) path analysis with two variables, our
FD-proxy and the log of per worker income ln (Y/L), both measured in 1980 and 1990.
According to the basic assumptions underlying the LISREL approach, all causal relationships
are assumed to be linear. The empirically observed covariance matrix will be disaggregated,
accordingly. The causal relationship between financial and real development is given by the
linear subsystem "structural equation model" of unobserved variables, as illustrated by
equation (16). Thereby, the causing factors are the latent exogenous variables of the first
observation period 1980 (Y/L1980 (= [1), FD1980 (= [2)), the depending variables are the
latent endogenous variables of the second observation period 1990 (Y/L1990 (= K1), FD1990
(= K2)). The impact of other factors is assumed to be unpredictable and characterized by latent
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The relationship between observed and unobserved variables is described by the two linear
subsystems 'x-measurement model' and 'y-measurement model' (see equations 17 and 18). The
observed indicators x (of [) and y (of K) are as defined above (cf. section 3.1) where G and H












































































































































y    .                                                    (18)
In the measurement model, the 'equal to 1' restriction of the respective first indicators of all
four latent variables allows to measure the unobserved variables in the scale of the respective
first indicator. In this specific context, we may think of subdividing our specific two-wave
model into the following two subsystems: a univariate regression model for Y/L with error ]1,
suppressing additional measurement errors (G1 { 0, H1 { 0); and a three-indicator model for
FD.
The random vectors H, G, ], [ and K of the LISREL model are assumed to obey the following
assumptions w.r.t. expectations E and covariance matrices Cov
                                                          
10 For an exception, see e.g. FOLLMER and KARMANN (1992)12
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The first line states that error variables as well as latent variables – because of
standardization – have zero mean. Zero correlation between latent exogenous variables and
errors is necessary to get consistent estimators, as in the case of standard regression.
Moreover, there is no correlation between the measurement errors H and G and the latent
variables [ and K. Between the error terms G and H, however, correlations are not ruled out a
priori. In our specification, the G errors of all three indicators of the latent variable FD are
allowed to correlate with their respective errors H of the lagged indicators. Precisely:
                                             ) , cov( 2 2 6 , 2 H G
GH   4     is a free parameter,
                                  ) , cov( 3 3 7 , 3 K G
GH   4       is a free parameter,                             (20)
                                                ) , cov( 4 4 8 , 4 K G
GH   4         is a free parameter,
                                                0 j , i   4GH                       for i z j otherwise (1 d i, j d 8).
This assumption reflects the possible correlation between the measurement errors of the
indicators EMPL80 and EMPL90, FINAN80 and FINAN90, as well as BNKW80 and
BANKW90, respectively, as not being covered by the linear relationship of, say, 'FD1980'
and 'FD1990 or 'Y/L1990' in the structural model. For the sample containing the whole set of
countries, no other relaxation's of the standard default values in the LISREL-8 version will be
made. To compare the structural relationship of the financial-real-development nexus for sub-
samples, here industrialized versus developing countries, however, we fix all O coefficients in
the subsamples to the values estimated for the whole sample set.
The two-wave model as specified by equations (16) to (20) is identified,11 i.e. the vector T
can be uniquely inferred from the empirical covariance matrix S, formally S = ¦ ) (T  for one
T.12
Concerning the measurement model, we assume the loading factors for the lagged pair of any
indicator to be identical. Hence we impose the identity restriction used in the context of time
invariant parameters
,
y x / { /                                                                                            (21)
i.e. . 4 4 3 3 O O O O
y x y x and      As the wave model is already identified without these two
restrictions, assumption (21) does not destroy this identification and adds two degrees of
                                                          
11 A formal proof for identification can be obtained from the authors upon request.
12 We submitted the hypothesis of time invariant parameters to a pretest for structural change which it passed
without falsification.13
freedom (dg), so that finally dg = p  (p + 1) /2 – q = (8  9)/2 – 20 = 16, where p is the number
of observed variables and q is the number of parameters to be estimated.13
To estimate our two-wave model, we use the maximum-likelihood method. Its asymptotic
properties rely on the assumption that, for the vector Z = (x, y)
T of observed variables, the
sample Z1,...., ZN (n = 93 countries) is independently, identically normally distributed with a
positive-definite covariance structure 6.
The (sequential) structure of causation reveals itself in the estimated elements of J. If neither
off-diagonal element is significantly different from zero, there is no indication for causation in
either direction; if both are, the model indicates mutual (bi-directional) causation.
Significance for J21 only implies unidirectional causation from Y/L to FD, which is consistent
with the demand-following finance hypothesis, whereas significance for J12 only implies
unidirectional causation from FD to Y/L, which is consistent with supply-leading finance as
defined by PATRICK (1966).
Thus, contrary to the usual strategy to search for patterns of GRANGER-causality drawing on
time series of within individual countries, the present approach exploits inter-country rather
than intra-county variance, thereby probably allowing more general conclusions. As with
GRANGER-causality, however, a problem with this approach is the determination of the lag.
Since the model assumes causality to operate between t1 and t2, the lag is crucial. Hence, for a
strict statistical test, the proper lag length should be derived from theory and then be specified
a priori, before running the statistical test.
The general advice for two-wave models is that the lag should be 'long enough'. The data base
allows lags to range from five to 20 years. However, given the widespread prevalence of
'financial repression' and turbulence on financial markets due to the oil price shocks, the
recycling of 'petro-dollars' and the resulting debt crises in the 1970's, we choose not to include
observations for 1970 and 1975. Hence, we determine a fixed lag from 1980 to 1990.
Accordingly, our statistical inference refers to the 1980's and generalization are – at least for
the time being – restricted to this decade only.
With this qualifications of the nature of the following empirical work, let us proceed to the
results.
The fitted values of the LISREL-two-wave-path-model specified in equations (16) to (21) are
given in figure 3. For the overall 'goodness of fit' of our path model, the deviation of the
empirical covariance matrix S  from the estimated covariance matrix resulting from the
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- S H : 1 , giving in a test statistics of F
2  = 20.3. With 16 degrees of freedom, this







- S  equal zero"
cannot be rejected (an overall model fit is considered to be "good" for p t 0.10; cf. BOLLEN
(1989: 266)). An alternative goodness of fit measures are the RMSEA (Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation), which equals .031 for our model and should not exceed 0.05 to
indicate a good fit (JÖRESKOG/SÖRBOM (1993)). Finally, LISREL's GFI (Goodness of Fit),
                                                          
13 T consists of the following 22 parameters: two O, four J, the free parameters of the covariance matrices )
(three parameters) and < (two parameters) for the latent variables and, for the indicators, the variances of G
and H (six parameters) as well as thee error covariances according to (20).14







- , is .96,
indicating as well that our model is very far from violating the empirical data.
Regarding the measurement model, the coefficients for our O-loadings of FINAN and
BANKW are close to one, and their t-statistics are highly significantly different from zero,
thus giving support to our approach to proxy FD as a latent variable of three independently
measured, but statistically intercorrelated indicator variables.
The estimates of our 'inner' structural model are crucial to detect (sequential) causal patterns.
Here, a positive (  

12 J .18), and statistically highly significant (t = 3.66) path coefficient from
FD1980 to Y/L1990 and, on the other hand a path coefficient from Y/L1980 to FD1990 which
does not differ significantly from zero (t = –1.58) are consistent with uni-directional causality
from FD to Y/L. Thus, our results point towards the conclusion that – at least in the 1980's and
from a very global perspective of a large sample of countries – supply-leading finance may
have prevailed, i.e. our model supports the supply-leading finance-hypothesis. If anything, the
negative (but insignificant) point estimate for   

21 J –.09) may be interpreted to indicate
financial 'saturation',14 whereas demand-following finance would be reconcilable with a
positive path only.
3.3  Looking for structural breaks between DC's and LDC's
While the empirical results derived above fit very well into the mainstream of the new
empirical growth literature, our theoretical modeling in section 2 is inclined to make us
suspicious about the stability of the overall results if the poorer countries are concerned.
Therefore, our third and final empirical exploration will be to relax the equality-restriction
and, accordingly, re-estimate a series of separate, non nested, two-wave path models for the
same period between  t = 1980 and t  =  1990, but for three sub-samples of our total of 93
countries grouped by Y/L in 1985, resulting in a first group of 31 DC's, a second group of 31
intermediate countries, and a final group of LDC's. As elaborated in section 3.2, in order to
maintain the comparability of the latent FD variables across groups and, thereby, the
structural relationship reflected in the estimates for J, we fix all O coefficients to the values
estimated for the whole sample set. The results for the off-diagonals of the inner model and
the overall fit are as follows:
                                                          
14 The negative path implies that higher per worker income in t = 1, ceteris paribus, will result in a decline of
resources channeled into the financial sector in the period between t = 1 and t = 2 as measured by our latent
FD-variables for 1980 and 1990.15
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
supply- demand-
group leading following fit (df = 18)
path path
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 DC's J12 = 1.01 J21 = –.12 F
2 = 11.2 p = .88
       (3.62)       (–1.56)
31 intermediate J12 = 2.73 J21 = –3.60 F
2 = 20.1 p = .29
      (1.23)       (–.53)
31 LDC's J12 =   .21 J21 =    .03 F
2 = 42.1 p = .0011
      (1.16)          (.66)
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(t–values in brackets)
An inspection of the results reveals that the J12 path (supply leading-finance) is highly
significant in the DC group, whereas it is positive, but not significantly different from zero in
the lesser developed sub-groups. On the other hand, the J21 path (demand following-finance)
is insignificant in all three groups; the point estimates are negative, however, in the two richer
subgroups, but positive in the LDC sub-group. Consequently, the general picture is that
though there are undoubtedly signs for supply leading finance; on a sub-group level of
analysis, this general finding can be replicated for the DC's only. For the 62 poorer countries
(roughly: the non OECD world) the standard errors are to large to allow statistical inference.
If anything can be said at all, our statistical findings are reconcilable with multiple growth-
causality regimes as well as with lack of any causation whatsoever; and signs for demand
following-finance (albeit weak and far from conventional significance levels) are detectable
among the poorest third of our sample only.
4  Conclusion
Our empirical results indicate that in the 1980's finance obviously mattered for growth.
However, while causation ran mainly from financial to real development with only little
evidence for mutual causation and no evidence at all for reverse causation (from real to
financial development only), a split of our country sample into DC's and LDC's reveals that
the finance-growth nexus is far from being a stable relationship. Specifically, while the results
of the overall model can be reproduced in the DC's alone, no clear relationship can be found
in the LDC subgroup. Our empirical results thus give some support to our theoretical
modeling which sketches formal arguments for the possibility of non-linearities and poverty
traps. While the relation between the degree of financial development and increases in output
is quite stable and positive for economies having experienced financial development for a
long period of time, this relation is vague for LDC's, as the widely dispersed observed growth
patterns reveal. Our general conclusion is that proponents of financial development are
probably right whenever they restrict their conclusions to developed market economies. For
the less developed countries, however, considerably less confidence is advisable. Regarding
the possibility of poverty traps as well as the demonstrated shakiness of the empirical
regularities established for the DC's among the poorer countries of the world, a policy of
financial development should be encouraged only after a careful evaluation with a result
which makes it seem likely that – as far as the finance growth-nexus is concerned – a given16
country's economic system is functioning in a fashion similar to that of developed market
economies.
Unfortunately, due to data availability, our framework presently does not allow statements
about the 1990s. Hopefully, more evidence on the stability of the finance-growth nexus may
be expected from new data, but at the present time we cannot give any empirical indications
about possible shifts or reversals of causation that might be due to recent phenomena
(financial liberalization and globalization of financial markets, growing numbers of active
stock markets as well as the recent financial crises, to name just a few).17
5  Appendix: sample, data and sources, figures
The sample consists of all countries for which the necessary data could be collected, with the
exception of countries that are very small (population less than one million), of countries with
centrally planned economies through most of the period 1980–90, countries in which oil
exports accounted for more than 20% of GDP in 1985, and countries with war or civil war
claiming a death toll exceeding 2.5% of total population during 1970–88. The exclusion of
these countries is to acknowledge that it may make very little sense to run regressions across
countries which are fundamentally different from usual conditions (cf. HARBERGER 1998).
The remaining total of countries numbers 93.
Y/L: Our proxy for real economic development is (the log of) per worker income. Data (real
gross domestic product per worker) are from the PENN WORLD TABLES (Mark 5.6), revised
December 1997, University of Toronto.
BANKW: The number of Banks and branches are counted from the corresponding editions of
the BANKERS' ALMANAC AND YEARBOOK, London: Thomas Skinner; labor force data (for
normalization) are from ILO and included in the PENN WORLD TABLES.
EMPL: The share of labor employed in the financial system is taken from various issues the
ILO YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS, Geneva. The corresponding ISIC-2 ('international
standard industrial classification of all economic activities', 1968) classification is 'major
division 8' (financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business services)
FINAN: The financial system's share of GDP is computed from various issues of the UN
NATIONAL ACCOUNT STATISTICS, New York, referring to 'finance, insurance and business
services'.18
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Figure 3: Path model, all countries (n = 93)
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